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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED):  
A HUMANITARIAN MINE 
ACTION PERSPECTIVE
by Robert Keeley
FEATURE
Readers of this Journal need no schooling in the ac-celeration of the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) over the last 20 years. However, what has be-
come obvious in the last few years is the degree to which the 
spheres of counter-IED (C-IED) and humanitarian mine ac-
tion (HMA) now overlap. Danish Demining Group (DDG), 
for example, recently calculated that an estimated 67 percent 
of the countries where DDG is present also have an IED prob-
lem. In countries such as Afghanistan, IEDs are now the ma-
jor cause of explosive-related casualties among the general 
population, the very constituents nongovernment organiza-
tions (NGO) and HMA sectors support. This raises questions 
of whether or not an NGO engaged in C-IED efforts can be 
classically impartial in circumstances where these IEDs are 
active. This is a significant difference for a sector primarily fo-
cused on dealing with the legacies of conflict that are explo-
sive remnants of war (ERW). Yet, while undertaking a series 
of risk assessments to help identify an appropriate approach 
for an NGO active in HMA, it became clear that there was a 
need for better common terminology in order for HMA actors 
to identify the appropriate response. The aim of this article is 
to outline how this thought process evolved in DDG in or-
der to set the ground for subsequent discussion of these risk- 
analysis processes.
What is an IED?
The name says it all. An IED is an explosive device that is 
made in an improvised manner. British parliamentarians cur-
rently define an IED as:
 A device placed or fabricated in an improvised 
manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, 
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to 
destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract.1
This term hides a multiplicity of variations: it might be a 
device based on a recycled item of unexploded ordnance 
(UXO), or built around a repurposed item of abandoned ex-
plosive ordnance (AXO) found in an unsecured or raided am-
munition stockpile. It might also be built from scratch from 
homemade explosives (HME). However, the common factor 
amongst these variations is that these constructions are im-
provised as opposed to factory-made, standardized weapons 
used for their intended purpose. In summary, the term IED is 
about how the weapon is made. 
What is the difference between an IED, a booby trap, or 
an improvised mine? Not much, in some cases. A booby trap 
is defined as follows:
An explosive or non-explosive device, or other material, 
deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently 
harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is 
performed.2
Booby
Trap
Mine
IED
“Artisanal Mine”
Figure 1. How IED terms overlap.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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One can immediately see how easily these two terms over-
lap. It is possible to set up an IED to produce such a situation. 
Yet the term booby trap can also apply to non-explosive traps 
(e.g., punji sticks in Vietnam) and a command-detonated IED 
is not necessarily linked to the person carrying out an appar-
ently harmless act. If the term IED is about how the device is 
made, the term booby trap describes how the device is set up 
to function.
Thirdly, one must consider how improvised or artisanal 
mines fit into this taxonomy. The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) defined a mine as:
any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by 
the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.3 
Here we see another overlap. Mines are commonly factory-
built, but it is quite possible to make a victim-operated IED. 
The mine definition is about how the device is initiated.
One could easily spend time wrestling with these defini-
tions. Take any particular device: which one of these catego-
ries does it fit into? In many cases, a given device can fit in two, 
sometimes even three, categories at once. Because these terms 
developed from different historical roots, they overlap and de-
scribe different attributes of the device: the way it is constructed, 
the way it is set up, and the way it is initiated (Figure 1, page 5). 
If the terms aren’t used correctly, there is a risk of over- 
reporting the problem. Secondly, because of their improvised 
nature, IEDs often require different training and equipment 
for counteractions; if the problem is misunderstood, the bal-
ance of training and other resources will also be wrong.
Moreover, there have been efforts to adjust the definition 
of booby trap to only cover factory-built devices. From the 
author’s perspective, this attempt to square the definition cir-
cle is not helpful. The terms describe different attributes, and 
trying to make them fit a convenient perspective could simply 
add further confusion.4 Perhaps a booby trap is not a separate 
type of weapon but merely another method of deployment.
How do IEDs fit into the spectrum of explosive incidents? 
In situations of counterinsurgency, asymmetric warfare, or 
internal security, the civilian population, civil power, human-
itarian actors, and security forces face a range of different ex-
plosive threats, of which IEDs are only part of the spectrum. 
NATO’s early work in Afghanistan helps to untangle the 
range of these threats.5 Figure 2 was developed as a risk as-
sessment carried out by the author on behalf of the U.N. Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) in Mali in October 2015.
Figure 3 (page 7) helps clarify a number of points. First, cur-
rent security incidents (case 2) can stand alongside incidents 
from legacy weapons (case 1). In fact, these legacy weapons led 
to the establishment of the HMA sector. Second, current and 
active security incidents can involve a range of weapons that 
are not IEDs, including direct fire, indirect fire from factory- 
built mortars, surface-to-air missile (SAM) attacks on civil 
aircraft, or placement of factory-built anti-tank mines—all of 
which are significant but not IED incidents. It should also be 
noted that, for clarity, the diagram does not include the range 
of criminal weapon uses that might be included under a wider 
definition of armed violence (case 3) such as armed robbery, 
inter-communal disputes, or even domestic violence.
How Do We Describe Different IEDs?
During the 20th century, simpler terms were in use such as 
letter bombs, parcel bombs, unattended bags, and car bombs. 
Figure 2. NATO weapons definitions from Afghanistan. Note that this does include reference to “legacy” incidents from explosive 
remnants of war.
Figure courtesy of UNMAS.
Security incidents are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire i.e. mortar, rocket and artillery, 
surface-to-air fire, and explosive hazard) events to include executed attacks (i.e. IED explosion, mine strike) and potential 
or attempted attacks (i.e. IEDs, mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins) which are not included.
Security incidents do not include friendly action incidents such as direct fire and indirect fire that are initiated by friendly 
forces. Enemy-initiated attacks are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and 
explosive hazard events to include executed attacks only (i.e. IED explosions and mine strikes). Potential or attempted 
attacks (i.e. IEDs/mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins) are not included.
IED events comprise explosive hazard events, both executed (i.e. IED explosion/mine strike) and potential IED/mine attacks 
(i.e. IEDs/mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins).
A complex attack is an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon 
systems (i.e. indirect fire and direct fire, IED, and surface-to-air fire) against one or more targets.
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol21/iss1/3
7ISSUE 21.1 @ APRIL 2017
These terms were not precise but counter-IED personnel knew 
what they meant. In recent years, there has been a signifi-
cant proliferation of terms (particularly involving acronyms) 
intended to make our vocabulary more exact. However, this 
article argues that the opposite was achieved. We now have 
vehicle-born IEDs (VBIED), victim-operated IEDs (VOIED), 
command wire detonated IEDs (CWIED), suicide vehicle-
borne IEDs (SVBIED), improvised rocket-assisted munitions 
(IRAM), etc. While it is comparatively easy to learn what these 
acronyms mean, perhaps they obscure what is actually needed 
for a fuller analysis.
These terms describe one or both of two main attributes 
of IEDs: the nature of the containment and the means of ini-
tiation. Thus a VBIED can be command detonated by wire 
(CWIED) or remote control (RCIED), it could be detonated 
on a timer, victim-operated (VOIED) or be operated by a sui-
cide bomber (SVBIED). So, which one of these is it?6 
Currently, organizations tend to use a reporting form with 
a list of boxes for each of these terms and ask reporting offi-
cers to select one. This fails the rule of lists, which requires 
a list to be both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive.7 One-dimensional lists simply cannot consider some-
thing with two variable attributes without significantly more 
letters. Yet an IED in a car initiated by a com-
mand wire could be reported by a peacekeeping 
contingent as a VBIED while another unit re-
cords an identical device as a CWIED. There are 
two implications. The security forces will be un-
able to correctly analyze the threat and design 
the appropriate response if the dataset is incom-
plete. Additionally, it will be harder to design 
appropriate risk education from the humanitar-
ian perspective if both attributes are not clearly 
understood.
Risk is a precise mathematical term that con-
siders both the probability of a particular inci-
dent occurring and the severity of its outcome. 
The containment of an IED and its size speaks 
directly to the severity of the potential outcome. 
A Unabomber-style letter bomb can potentially 
hurt one or two people: a van full of ammonium 
nitrate can bring down an entire federal build-
ing in Oklahoma, whereas the means of initia-
tion speaks to the probability of the incidence. 
Furthermore, good risk education processes 
discuss and suggest safe behavior. In order to 
do this, it is critical that the people designing 
the risk education programs have a good understanding of the 
typical means of initiation used in order to provide advice on 
indicators, safe behavior, and containment.8
As a result, a matrix is the suggested means of describing 
and recording IED incidents, rather than a simple list of terms 
(Figure 4, page 8). 
Implications for Humanitarian Actors
There is clearly an overlap of IED, booby trap, and mine def-
initions. The terms are not interchangeable. The C-IED and 
HMA practitioners stand to benefit from recognizing this, as 
they set the basis for the rest of the taxonomy. Moreover, IEDs 
are only one part of a series of explosive and weapon-related 
hazards that might be faced in a particular country, including 
legacy ERW, attacks using factory-made weapons, and weap-
ons used in other incidents of armed violence that are not ter-
rorist or insurgency related. Classification of IED incidents, 
both in terms of containment and means of initiation, is im-
portant. By understanding the problem in terms of C-IED 
efforts, the community can appropriately target risk education 
messages with safe behavior.
As previously stated, while IEDs can consist of legacy weap-
ons, they are unlike ERW (in the context of HMA) in that 
they are often active. While some countries may have fields of 
Weapons
Incidents
1.  Legacy 
Incidents 
(ERW)
2. Security
 incidents
3. Other “Armed 
Violence”
2.1 Direct Fire 2.2 Indirect Fire 2.3 Surface/Air 2.4 Explosive Hazard Event
2.4a Executed 2.4b Potential 2.4c False Alarm
2.4a(1) Mine 2.4a(2) IED
2.4b(1) Cache 2.4b(2) Found
2.4c(1) Hoax 2.4c(2) Unintended
Figure 3. Description of IEDs.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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legacy improvised mines such as Sri Lanka, these are still the 
exception rather than the rule. The entire HMA sector is based 
on the assumption that when a conflict is over, the population 
will be united in wanting ERW removed. In an active conflict, 
clearance of active IEDs by HMA actors may be seen as a hos-
tile act. While it may be possible for commercial civilian op-
erators to deal with this, it is difficult for NGO actors to take 
a similar position. NGO personnel must already deal with the 
dilemma that they cannot be truly impartial, and an NGO 
that clears active IEDs is effectively taking part in the wider 
counterinsurgency. The security implications for the staff of 
that NGO are significant. Yet, some donors are asking NGOs 
to undertake IED disposal (IEDD); thus a wider understand-
ing and discussion of the issues are critical for everyone’s clar-
ity of purpose.
DDG has already looked at creating a more detailed risk 
analysis for organizations wishing to undertake IED risk edu-
cation. Furthermore, DDG is working to understand the steps 
needed for a humanitarian organization considering whether 
or not to undertake IEDD as humanitarian action: both of 
which might merit further discussions in later papers. 
See endnotes page 64
Ser Means of containment Typical means of Initiation Remarks
Timer Remote Controlled 
(RCIED)
Command Wire
(CWIED)
Victim operated
(VOIED)
Suicide Other
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f ) (g) (h) (i)
1 Letter bomb x
2 Pipe bomb x
3 Person-born IED (PBIED) x Suicide vest
4 Mortar or rocket x May be an improvised 
weapon or factory-
made weapon using 
improvised launcher
5 Buried bomb x x x Improvised mine when 
operated by victim
6 Box/briefcase/bag x x x x Includes typical 
roadside bomb, such as 
palm oil container
7 Vehicle born IED (VBIED) x x x x x Could be divided into 
small, medium or large
Figure 4. DDG IED classification matrix.
Figure courtesy of the author.
The original article first appeared in the Counter-IED Report, 
autumn 2016 edition. It has been edited for The Journal.
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